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ABSTRACT
This  work  investigates  the  role  and  contribution  of  external  auditing  as  practised  in  the 
Malaysian society during the forty year period from independence in 1957 to just before the 
onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  It applies the political economic theory introduced 
by  Tinker  (1980)  and  refined  by  Cooper  &  Sherer  (1984),  which  emphasises  the  social 
relations aspects of professional activity rather than economic forces alone. In a case study 
format  where  qualitative  data  was  gathered  mainly  from  primary  and  secondary  source 
materials, the study  found that the function of auditing in the Malaysian society in most cases 
is devoid of any essence of mission; instead it is created, shaped and changed by the pressures 
which give rise to its development over time. The largely insignificant role that it serves is 
intertwined within the contexts in which it operates. 
Keywords:  external  audit,  Malaysia,  politics,  history,  economy,  Companies  Act  1965, 
Companies Act 1985, British Companies Acts, Accountants Act 1967, Asian Financial Crisis 
      
DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITING IN MALAYSIA: LEGAL, POLITICAL 
AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES1
Introduction
The  activity  of  external  auditing  as  conducted  by  audit  firms  intervenes  between  the 
preparation  of  financial  and  non-financial  information  relating  to  a  particular  entity  by 
management  and  the  (supposed)  use  by  many  different  groups  of  users  of  this  audited 
information. In Malaysia, this audit is characterised by little publicity and little public clamour 
for needed changes.  There may be a few lone voices from both the public and private sectors 
asking  auditors and their representative bodies, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
and the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA) to do a better job, 
but that seems to be where the "story" ends.2 From time to time there would also be certain 
exposures/revelations’ which provide proof that external audit in the country is in need of a 
certain level of revamp.  
Examples include the revelation made by the Central Bank of Malaysia that the 
main  issues  of  contention  between  the  Central  Bank  and  the  external  auditor  were  a 
consequence of the auditor having compromised his or her independence  in two proven areas 
of  financial  reporting:  disclosure and the provisional  figure for bad and doubtful  accounts 
(Central Bank, 1987, p. 6).  On the former issue in particular, there had been cases where the 
auditor  either  worked  together  with  management  or  agreed  with  management  efforts  at 
"window-dressing" the accounts  leading to  inadequate  disclosure of  significant  changes  in 
accounting policy and/or unneeded adjustments  to certain disclosed items .  A few years later 
in 1991, it was an auditor himself, Mr. Khoo Eng Choo, a senior partner of  Price Waterhouse, 
who mentioned that there were local auditors who "...  have been found not to have exercised 
sound professional judgement" (Choo, 1991, p. 23).  He also made the following revelation (p. 
23): “It is also unfortunate that sometimes some members of the profession have sunk to the 
level of enabling some unscrupulous members of the business community to dictate to them 
the  approach  'Just  your  signature'  is  enough.   They become  poodles  or  lapdogs  of  these 
businessmen.  These members are tarnishing the image of the profession and have failed in 
their duties.”  
But  even  with  these  revelations,  the  one  single  case/only  incident  where  a 
Malaysian auditor has been brought to court took place in the mid-1960s when a group of 
company shareholders unhappy with the losses they had incurred,  sued the auditor.3 Thus, 
during economic recessions in the 1980s, when many businesses were forced to close down 
and  cases  of  financial  improprieties  by  directors  and  top  management  were  disclosed, 
Malaysian auditors avoided being taken to court.   In this  regard, the then finance minister 
Datuk Paduka (now Tun) Daim Zainuddin was quoted by the  New Straits Times4 (12 Sept. 
1987) as saying that "... it is a miracle that no member of the public or any interested party has 
sued  auditors  for  being professionally negligent  taking into  account  the  various  "swindle" 
cases  recently  ...."   The  blissful  existence  of  Malaysian  auditors  certainly contrasts   that 
experienced by teachers/lecturers, government servants, politicians, Malay rulers, nurses who 
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have all by the early 1990s entered the limelight of adverse publicity. Other professionals, such 
as  physicians  and lawyers  have also  in  recent  years,  been  confronted  with  adverse  public 
scrutiny.5 
Indeed, if there is any profession or group of people in the country which seems 
to have been able to operate with little challenge to its practices, it is the so-called company 
auditors. This in fact had led Oh Chong Peng, the then vice-president of the MACPA and also 
a senior partner of Malaysia's Coopers and Lybrand, to argue that there was still not enough 
pressure coming from the  Malaysian  society in  order  for  the auditor  to  extend  his  or  her 
responsibilities -  despite the recent numerous cases of failures of companies, both listed and 
unlisted, where  auditors had failed to give warning by qualifying in their audit reports that 
such companies were not going-concerns (Peng, 1989). Thus, he pointed out, there was little 
need for the accounting profession to put forward reactive measures. Similar sentiments may 
also be found in the remarks made by his colleague, the then MACPA president, Subimal Sen 
Gupta (The Malaysian Accountant, July 1987, p. 4).  The latter figure had also pointed out that 
even the regulatory authorities were oblivious to the on-goings (more appropriate)/goings-on 
in audit.6
What is happening in Malaysia is considerably different from that experienced 
by auditors in countries such as the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia.  In these 
countries, they are often criticised for  business failures and a number have had to pay large 
damages  or  settle  out  of  court  with  plaintiffs  accusing them of  committing  audit  failures. 
Besides  the  court,  regulatory  agencies  and  other  groups  have  also  played  their  part  in 
demanding that the profession move in an expeditious fashion to meet its responsibilities as 
perceived by the public  (see Flint,  1983; Bruce,  1988; Humphrey  et al.,  1992; and Jacob, 
1992).  In  these  countries,  even  where  external  economic  factors  force  businesses  into 
liquidation and there is little proof of auditors' failure to conduct audits properly, the auditors 
have nonetheless become implicated in the failure. 
 Malaysia's auditing experience when compared to other Asian countries such as 
South Korea, Hong Kong, India and Singapore ,  is a source of surprise.  This is because unlike 
what has happened in Malaysia,  auditors in these countries have experienced tough times with 
their authorities.7  In the case of South Korea and Singapore, the auditors concerned have also 
been brought to court by  disgruntled investors.8
This  paper  thus  attempts  to  explain  this  Malaysian  audit  phenomenon  by 
applying the alternative contextual view of accounting i.e. the theory of political  economy, 
with the theory of political economy introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined for accounting 
by Coopers and Sherer (1984). Attempts are made to understand how the distribution of power 
in the society and the social, political and institutional structures that mirror that distribution of 
power have impacted the functioning of audit in Malaysia across a period of forty years, from 
the  gaining  of  independence  from the  British  in  August  1957 to  the  time  just  before  the 
emergence of the Asian Financial Crisis in the third quarter of 1997.  In other words, auditing 
is  understood  here  to  be  interrelated  with  the  dynamics  of  the  wider  sociopolitical  and 
economic context of which it is an integral part.  It is considered to be a mutable phenomenon, 
interacting  with  a  dynamic,  mutable  context  (Hopwood,  1987).  By examining  the  social, 
economic and political environments surrounding auditing together with developments within 
auditing itself,  it  is  hoped that  the original,  present  and potential  functions  of  auditing in 
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Malaysia will be disclosed fairly - perhaps in the spirit of the following remark by Burchell et 
al. (1980, p.13): "... accounting, it would appear, is made to be purposive rather than being 
inherently purposeful." 
While this is a country-specific study, it also provides a contribution within the 
framework of international comparative auditing research (professionalisation or professional 
developments) by adding to studies of the causes and effects of auditing variation between 
countries  classified  under  the  typology of  fast  developing  economies.   Another  form  of 
contribution of this work is concerned with the issue raised by Willmott (1991, p. 109): that 
the study of auditing "has been seriously neglected and marginalised,  even as evidence of 
‘failures’ mounts and doubts about the independence of auditors grow".  It is thus hoped that 
this paper will be able to contribute in some way towards enriching this very important area. 
Finally, by carrying out this research, it is specifically hoped that the profile of auditing will be 
raised in  Malaysia  to  direct  the attention  of  more  influential  parties  (e.g.  politicians,  civil 
servants, journalists, consumer groups) to  probing questions about the operation and adequacy 
of  existing audit regulatory arrangements (Sikka et al., 1989; Willmott, 1985) with  focus also 
directed to other areas related to the audit practice.
The paper begins with a discussion of the theory of the political economy of 
accounting.  It is then followed by a section on data collection.  A section describing the on-
goings/goings-on in the audit arena and related areas follows right after. This section is divided 
into three parts: the early beginnings, the NEP era and the post-NEP era of 1987-1997.  In 
attempting to make sense of what has taken place, the subsequent section applies the theory of 
the political economy of accounting to that section where the discussion is imparted into two 
parts:   the  pre-NEP  era  and  the  NEP  plus  era.  The  paper  then  ends  with  a  section  on 
conclusions. 
The Political Economy of Accounting
The political economic theory was introduced by Tinker (1980) and refined by Cooper and 
Sherer  (1984)  to  explain  accounting  experiences.  Tinker  (1980)  in  introducing  a  classical 
political  economic  approach  to  financial  reporting,  proposes  that  the  social  relations  of 
production work together with the economic forces of production as two related dimensions of 
capital shaping the social and economic life of a nation.  He points out that in any society, the 
coming together of the two modes of production is discernible in the particular socio-political 
and economic institutional forms and arrangements. The use of political economic theory that 
recognises  the  presence  of  social  relations  makes  it  less  cumbersome  to  understand  the 
economic  forces of production  that  are  operating at  any particular  time period and in  any 
society.  Tinker explains that such relations are reflected through a set of institutional forms 
and arrangements  that  are constructed to  interact  with economic  relations  (i.e.  the type of 
economy).  
Therefore,  in  order to  understand what  is  going on in  the economic sphere, 
which may include the external audit function, researchers need to identify the related socio-
economic  and  institutional  environments.  Interpretation  of  a  nation's  specific  economic 
features will  be less clearer if  insufficient  attention  is  given to the surrounding social  and 
political processes.  In regard to accounting activity in particular, Cooper and Sherer (1984) 
point  out  that  a political  economy of accounting is  useful in order to  understand how the 
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accounting process interacts with its social, economic and political environment. They write as 
follows (p.208):
... the objectives of and for accounting are fundamentally contested, arise out of recognition 
that  any form of  accounting  contains   representation  of  a  specific  social  and  political 
context.   Not  only is  accounting  policy essentially political  in  that  it  derives  from the 
political  struggle in  society as a whole but  also the outcomes of  accounting policy are 
essentially political in that they operate for the benefit of some groups in society and to the 
detriment of others.
Thus, it is assumed that  no basic harmony of interests exist in the current society.  Auditing 
practice is viewed as favouring specific dominant interests in the society and disadvantaging 
others. That is, what transpires in the audit process would be in accord with the expectations or 
goals of these dominant parties.  Cooper and Sherer (1984) have also identified the presence of 
several  key  variables  which  they  claim  affect  the  value  of  financial  accounting  reports 
including  power-play in  society and  historical  specificity.  On  the  former,  they argue  that 
social-relations of power and conflict9 determine the  significance of accounting, which in turn 
affects such relationships. Instead of assuming a basic harmony of interests in a society where 
power is widely diffused and which results to the unproblematic view of the social value of 
accounting reports, the political economy approach supports the following contrasting views: 
either  that  society is  seen  as  clearly controlled  by a  well  defined  elite  or  that  there  is  a 
continuing conflict in society between antagonistic classes.10  Both views of elitist domination 
and  pluralist  anarchy  indicate/testify  to  the  contested  value  of   accounting  reports  and 
practices. Thus, accounting reports are hardly impartial and objective, nor is the accountant in 
the position of a disinterested and innocuous historian.  
The  latter  variable  of  historical  specificity  stresses  the  importance  of  the 
specific historical and institutional environments comprising the social and political structures 
and cultural  values  of  the society that  provide the context  for  the delivery of  accounting 
reports.  There is recognition that "disequilibrium is a standard feature of the economy" as 
proven by the presence of a few large corporations dominating the economy and that the state 
plays paramount roles in various fields including that of intervening in the determination of 
accounting policies. The historical focus in particular should assist efforts in understanding the 
changing roles of accounting practice and emphasises the importance of historical specificity 
for a fair assessment of the social value of these roles.   
In  summary,  a  political  economy of  accounting  focuses  on  the  institutional 
environment  which  supports  the  existing  system  of  corporate  reporting.   It  looks  at  the 
accounting function within the broader structural  and institutional  environment  in which it 
operates.  It stresses that political issues cannot be divorced from economic analysis in relation 
to social choices. It revolves around power and whose interests predominate in society which 
inevitably impact upon auditing. Thus, under the political  economy approach, the focus on 
social relations leads to the proposition that certain parties possess special interests that often 
influence the audit process.  
Also,  with  political  economy as  the  theoretical  framework,  the rationale  for 
Malaysia's audit function may be discovered by linking the history of the nation's audit practice 
with  the  nation's  history  within  the  social,  economic  and  political  spheres.  Thus,  the 
understanding is viewed as coming about not through the study of separate and overt elements 
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of the audit infrastructure and its technical outputs, but through a more comprehensive and in-
depth  study  of  these  and  other  items  considered  crucial  to  such  an  understanding.  The 
assumption held throughout is that  audit activities taking place within a certain length of time 
are associated with a unique configuration of social, economic and political conditions. That is, 
these activities are products of  social, economic and political realities and that differences in 
audit activities across several time periods may be traced to  changes in these realities. It is 
very much recognised however, that the "story" told is most probably only one of many.  As 
succinctly  noted  by Carnegie  and  Napier  (1996,  p.  30):  “Researchers  starting  from quite 
distinct  theoretical  perspectives  and with disparate moral  and political  attitudes  could well 
narrate virtually the same chronology of “facts”: how those facts are interpreted is likely to 
differ widely.” 
Data Collection
The  study  relies  on  qualitative  data  gathered  by  utilising  the  technique  of  documentary 
analysis.  All  the  documents  referred  to,  lend  insight  into  the  perspectives,  assumptions, 
concerns and activities of those who produced them.  The primary written materials assessed 
and analysed  comprise mainly of the annual reports of  accounting bodies such as  the MIA 
and the MACPA and government documents such as the numerous Malaysian Plans.  The 
secondary written sources relied on to provide data on Malaysia's auditing are few and far 
between.  There are conference materials at the ASEAN level where materials on Malaysia's 
auditing  are  discussed  and  a  few  others  at  national  level  and  books  by Gul  (1983)  and 
Enthoven  (1973,  1977).  Where  it  concerns  the  nation's  social,  economic  and  political 
environments,  numerous  secondary  written  sources  were  accessed  including  various 
authoritative sources published over the years in and out of the country.  The same was done in 
investigating  developments  in  the  nation's  history  and  in  systems  of  relevance  to  audit: 
corporations, government and capital funds.
Much of these materials were collected during the field work which took place 
in the first six months of 1997. However, the rest, especially in the area of accounting/auditing 
in  Malaysia,  were  collected  long  before  the  field  work  began  and   culminated  with  the 
publication of a book published locally (see Azham, 1994).
Finally, it needs to be mentioned that this study forms part of a wider one on 
accounting development in Malaysia in which in-depth interviews with selected personalities 
were  conducted.   A number  of  these  personalities  were  leaders  of  Malaysia’s  accounting 
profession.  Where  appropriate,  materials  from these interviews  are  also  introduced in  this 
paper to add up to the points  raised.  These cases are however very few and far between. 
Details regarding the interviews may be found in Azham (2002). 
Audit in Malaysia Over the Years 
In the following section,  the early beginnings  of  audit  development  and the 
trials  and  tribulations  faced  by a  number  of  players  in  the  audit  arena  in  later  years  are 
described. It begins with audit developments taking place right after the independence of the 
Malay Federation.  It is followed by the on-goings/goings-on in the audit  arena during the 
years  when  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  took  place.  The  section  concludes  with  a 
description of what happened during a period of just over ten years prior to the onset of the 
Asian Financial  Crisis  in  the third  quarter  of  1997.   With  an application  of the theory of 
political economy of accounting, this section also describes developments taking place in areas 
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surrounding the audit arena, such as the government and corporate sectors, and their impacts. 
In order  to distinguish this discussion from the one following, more emphasis is however, 
placed on developments taking place within the audit arena. 
The Audit Beginning of a Newly Independent Nation
The  passing  of  the  Companies  Act  1965  and  the  Accountants  Act  1967 
facilitated the emergence of the initial pattern of audit system, replacing a pre-existing pattern 
where there was no law to govern the operations of companies throughout the newly formed 
federation11 and  a  national  accounting  body  to  represent  all  qualified  accountants  in  the 
country. These Malaysian Acts are similar to those found overseas. 
The Companies Act 1965 drew mainly on two sources: the Victoria Companies 
Act of 1961 and the British Companies Act 1948 (Walton, 1986).12  The former in turn was 
based  upon  the  UK  Companies  Act  1908,  1929  and  1948  while  the  latter  on  the  UK 
Companies Act 1929.  The Act placed the requirement on  companies to disclose more than 
ever before.  It also requires companies to keep accounting records so as to have true and fair 
statements prepared and that record keeping should be executed in such a way so as to enable 
the records to be conveniently and properly audited.  
In  matters  of  auditing,  the  Act  stressed  the  need  for  the  auditor  to  be 
independent. This is illustrated in cases where he or she is not allowed to be an officer or 
director  or  had  share  holding  (either  direct  or  indirect)  with  the  companies  audited.   In 
addition, the auditor was given  very broad powers  in relation to matters of inspecting records 
and obtaining  information  for  the  audit  and  had  the  right  to  attend  and address   general 
meetings of the company.  As in the earlier Companies Ordinance 1946, the academic and 
professional qualifications of the auditor were not specified.  However, under section 8 of the 
Companies Act,  a person had to apply to the Finance Minister  in order to gain license to 
become a company auditor.13  In order to get the license, he or she besides being a Malaysian 
resident,  had  to  be  able  to  satisfy the  Finance  Minister  of  his  or  her  good character  and 
competence to perform the duties of an auditor.  The passing of the Accountants Act 1967 
roughly a year after the Companies Act came into existence had ensured however that being a 
member of the MIA was a requirement  before one could be given the permission to audit 
although the Companies Act 1965 has not made that clear (Shing, 1981, p. 32;  Abu-Hassan, 
1986, p. 4).
The Accountants  Act  1967 resembles  the  Singapore  Society of  Accountants 
Ordinance 1963 which in turn was based upon the New Zealand Society of Accountants Act - 
the main difference being that the Malaysian Act was "much briefer" and thus "less explicit" 
than the Singaporean Ordinance (Hai, 1970/71, pp. 27-28). With the Accountants Act 1967 
coming into existence in September that year, the MIA emerged as the nation’s accounting 
statutory  body.  Section  6  of  the  Act  notes  five  functions  of  the  MIA  including  the 
responsibility  to  regulate  the  practice  and  promote  the  interests  of  the  profession  and  to 
determine the qualifications of persons for purposes of admission as members.  With regards 
to the latter in particular, the MIA is required to maintain a register of accountants.  These 
accountants fall under one of three categories of membership: public, registered and licensed 
accountants.14  
To  ensure  that  only qualified  people  whose  principal  place  of  residence  is 
Malaysia can act as public and registered accountants, the MIA through the Accountants Act 
has made it illegal under Sections 22 and 23 for anybody to hold him/herself out as a public, 
registered or licensed accountant or adopt, use or exhibit these titles or others such as auditors, 
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tax consultants and tax adviser.15 Any transgression would mean the person being held liable 
for a maximum fine of  RM 1000 or imprisonment for up to one year for the first offence and 
with subsequent transgressions being liable for a maximum fine of  RM 2000 or imprisonment 
of two years. In short, as stated in the House of Representatives' Parliamentary Debates (Vol. 
IV, No. 12, Col. 2409 dated 25 Aug. 1967), the Act is intended to make provision for the 
adequate control of the accounting profession as a whole, and this control is to be entrusted to 
the MIA  under the establishment of the Act. 
Finally,  the accounting body MACPA, as opposed to that of the MIA,  was 
established through the initiative of the private sector.  To be more precise, in less than one 
year  after  independence,  on  26  July  1958,  twenty  local  accountants  who  were  formerly 
members of the Malayan branch of the Association of Chartered and Incorporated Accountants 
(ACIA) and the Malayan branch of the Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants 
(ACCA),  both  established  in  1936,  came  together  and  incorporated  the  Malayan  (later 
Malaysian) Association  of Certified Public  Accountants  (MACPA) in  Singapore under  the 
Straits Settlement Companies Ordinance 1940 (CERPASS, Dec. 1967, p. 51The MACPA was 
modelled upon the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) and is a 
good example of those accounting professional bodies described by Parker (1989) as following 
the British institutions of professional accountancy. 
The newly independent nation appeared set on ensuring that activities in the 
nation’s audit arena would fulfill the need for foreign investors. The same appeared to be the 
case in the related area of taxation where the government in its attempts to attract industrial 
investment from overseas had brought upon itself the criticism of providing foreigners with 
excessive  tax  exemptions  (Lim,  1973,  p.  261;  Edwards,  1975,  Section  5.2).  Specifically, 
among  limited companies in the manufacturing sector in 1971, the effective rates of direct 
taxation  on  profits  were  67.6  percent  and  39.9  percent  for  local  and  foreign  companies, 
respectively.  As  for  all  limited  companies  in  1971,  the  rates  were  59.8  percent  and  39.5 
percent, respectively (Jomo, 1986, p. 222). All this apparently took place when the rates of 
reinvestment16 by  foreign-owned  companies  were  much  less  compared  to  local-owned 
companies (see Hirschman,  1971, pp. 26, 30, Table 6;  Peng, 1979, p. 192, Table 4.4;  and 
Lindenberg, 1973).  
With the occurrence of conflicts between Malays and Chinese in 1969, it was 
realised that  for the long term good of  the country,   changes  needed to  take place in  the 
nation’s economy and other sectors of Malaysian life.  Thus, the subsequent implementation of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 heralded a new era where  foreign interests now had 
to play a secondary role to those inside the country – in particular that  of the government 
which entered the corporate sector in full steam.   This had  a profound impact on the audit 
arena as is discussed under the next section. 
Audit in the NEP Era
For years, there had been underlying tensions  between the Malays and Chinese. In May 1969, 
the tensions boiled over/escalated to a point with the Malays and the Chinese being involved in 
riots on the streets of Kuala Lumpur and resulting in nearly two hundred  deaths and hundreds 
more injured.17  The racial riots had jolted many parties to the realisation that more riots could 
take place in the future as long as the country remained the same socially,  politically and 
economically.  Thus, drastic measures had to be taken in many fields. In the socio-economic 
field, the NEP was initiated in 1971 with the goals of eradicating poverty - regardless of race 
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and irrespective of geographical location - and reducing imbalances in income, employment 
and ownership of assets among the various races in the country. In attempting to meet these 
objectives by 1990, the government implemented a number of strategies.
Among the notable ones are the pursuance of an ownership and employment 
restructuring program imposed on both non-indigenous domestic  and foreign owned firms 
(Zainal-Aznam, 1991a; Jesudason, 1989; Woon and Kam, 1989; Onn, 1989; Means, 1986; 
Chan and Horii, 1986; Redha, 1985; Woon, 1982).  As a result, laws such as the Petroleum 
Development  (Amendment)  Act  and the  Industrial  Coordination  Act  were passed in  1975 
which  had  the  goal  of  greater  government  control  over  industries.   Large  and  powerful 
merchant agency houses such as Guthrie and Sime Darby now had to employ more Malays to 
fill the quota, restructure their capital to meet the Malay equity requirements and enter into 
joint ventures with entities established by the government. 
With foreign interests no longer being of paramount importance in the nation’s 
economy, the earlier “carrots” such as the Companies Act 1965 (which requires companies to 
undergo audit annually) and the Accountants’ Act 1967 (which resulted  to the establishment 
of the MIA as the national accounting body in 1967) were (left unapplied)/inactive until the 
second half of 1980s – when changes to a large extent, were made to the NEP.  Thus, the 
promising beginnings in the audit  arena of the 1960s had gone nowhere by the end of the 
decade.  Perhaps this was inevitable in a context where the strong presence of the government 
and the increasing involvement of local Chinese in the corporate sector signified that these 
corporations were owned, managed and funded by people from their own respective Malay and 
Chinese  communities  who shared  goals  that  were  not  only economic  but  also  social  and 
political.  The enterprises were registered as companies but in  reality they were unlike those 
known as companies in the Western sense of the word "company" with conflicting interests 
from  different  parties.   There  was  thus  little  need  for  the   “independent”  auditor  and 
accordingly a strong, capable representative professional cum regulatory body to be around. 
The MIA in Doldrums.  Following the appointment of the then Accountant-General18 as the 
MIA's  president  on  31  May 1968,  no  single  AGM  was  conducted  in  the  following  two 
decades.  The MIA under the leadership of the Accountant General,  which finally came to an 
end in April 1987, presumably took over the role of "registering body".19  But even this was 
delegated  to  the  audit  firm  Price  Waterhouse.  In  1982,  the  MACPA  took  over  this 
responsibility.  (See a set of untitled bounded documents in the MIA library, stamped on its 
first  page  as  "Confidential"  and  dated  1  October  1988  and  which  appears  to  have  been 
forwarded to  the  then Finance Minister  by the  MIA Council  to  gain  his  approval  for  the 
various amendments suggested for the Accountants Act 1967.  Hereinafter, it will be referred 
to as the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document".) 
The  role  of  the  MIA as  “registering  body”  in  those  two  decades  was  well 
articulated  by the  MIA president,  Haji  Hanifah Noordin,  just  before the  first  MIA annual 
general meeting in 1987.  He said that ".... the earlier members of the [MIA] council could not 
be entirely blamed for the inactive state of the MIA because in the earlier years it was felt that 
it  should  only  be  involved  in  its  limited  role  of  registering  accountants  in  the  country" 
(Business  Times,  10  Sept.  1987).  Unfortunately,  the  MIA did  not  execute  that   function 
successfully.  In other words, there were those fully qualified to register with the MIA who had 
failed  to  do  so.   Thus,  just  a  few  months  after  the  MIA was  activated  in  1987,  it  was 
discovered that as of 29 February, 1988, of the country's 6000 or so qualified accountants, only 
      
10
4453 had registered themselves with the MIA (NST, 20 March 1988). The remainder who did 
not register were comprised of 600 members of the MACPA, 800 of the Chartered Association 
of Certified Accountants (CACA) and 200 accounting graduates from local universities.  
It may  be said with certainty that nothing substantial had actually taken place in 
the 1970s except for the passing of Accountants' Rules in 1972 which, however, were not 
enforced due to the nonexistence of the statutory investigative and disciplinary committees 
which could only be formed by the MIA after an AGM.  Thus, as reported by The Malay Mail 
(13 Jan. 1988), just a few months after the MIA was activated in 1987: "The recently activated 
Institute has formed investigation and disciplinary committees in September to regulate the 
profession  -  after  20  years  of  existence."  And the  MIA president  himself  mentioned  in  a 
seminar paper (Hanafiah, 1990, p. 17): "There was no enforcement of the Accountants Act 
1967 in its twenty years of dormancy."  
In the meantime, with a very discouraging picture for auditing helmed by a body 
behaving as if it was representing the majority if not all of the company auditors then, various 
debilitating outcomes took place in the nation’s audit arena not only within the next ten years, 
but also in the  1970s, and continued well into the following decade.  Two of such notable 
outcomes are the disciplinary chaos and the proliferation of unqualified accountants/auditors. 
Disciplinary  Chaos.  The  investigation  and  disciplinary  committees  of  the  MIA  were  not 
established until September 1987 after its first AGM. As a result, in the area of professional 
ethics and their enforcement, the Malaysian accounting profession, up to the late 1980s when 
the MIA was activated, appeared to be in a state of chaos. This is perhaps  illustrated by  the 
remarks made by the then MACPA president, Subimal Sen Gupta in 1986 where he mentioned 
that the MACPA as a "private body" could only be strict with  members who did not comply 
with  the  body's  ethical  code  and  that  the  body had  no  control  over  those  who  were  not 
members but who deserved to be disciplined.   He also said (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct. 
1986, p. 4):20 
The  MACPA  has  no  control  over  the  issue  of  the  audit  license  to  individuals  which 
qualifies  them  to  act  as  Approved  Company Auditors.   This  license  is  issued  by the 
Ministry  of  Finance  by  reference  to  the  Malaysian  Institute  of  Accountants  (MIA).  I 
therefore appeal to both these bodies to take cognisance of the disciplinary actions taken by 
MACPA against  its  members by taking appropriate action against  them if they are also 
members of the MIA and holders of the audit  license.   More importantly perhaps there 
should be a mechanism for taking action against those who are not members of MACPA. 
The MACPA will be pleased to assist in this respect. 
It is  also worth noting what was revealed in the letter published in 1988 in the NST.  In the 
letter written by a person who signed him/herself as "Disgusted", he described the mess in the 
then  audit  practice  (NST,  6  Aug.  1988):  "In  the  past,  any  attempt  [by  the  MACPA]  at 
disciplinary  control  over  errant  members  resulted  in  those  members  discontinuing  their 
membership with the MACPA and continuing to practice as public accountants as they are 
allowed to do under the Accountants Act 1967."
Proliferation of Unqualified Accountants/Auditors.  The 1967 Accountants Act states that only 
those  with  recognised  qualifications  may practice  or  call  themselves  accountants/auditors. 
However, with the MIA not fulfilling its policing role, unqualified accountants holding either 
unrecognised  qualifications,  part  qualifications  or  no  qualification  had  the  opportunity  to 
appear and grow with the then expanding economy in the 1970s and early 1980s.   As stated in 
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the  MIA 1988  Annual  Report  (p.  13):  "The  problem of  unqualified  accountants,  both  in 
practice  and in  commerce  and industry,  had proliferated to  serious  proportions  during the 
period of inactivity of the Institute." In early 1988, the MIA president disclosed that a study 
completed in 1981 (by what appeared to be the MACPA) found that there were 200 to 300 
people who were not qualified accountants who were active as public accountants, auditors 
and tax advisers in the country (Berita Harian,  13 Jan.  1988).  The number of unqualified 
accountants was amended later on in late 1988 to 3,000 with those  employed totalling  15,000 
(NST, 5 Nov. 1988). Most of the unqualified public accountants were also now identified to 
have come from corporate secretarial and administrative firms (The Star, 5 Nov. 1988).  
Also in 1988, the MIA had pointed out that  unqualified accountants acting as 
auditors would collaborate with the qualified auditors in the sense that the latter would be paid 
a token fee (normally a 30 percent cut) for certifying and endorsing financial statements that 
had presumably been audited earlier by the unqualified auditors (NST, 20 March 1988). In the 
MIA 1988 Annual  Report,  the following was stated (p.  14):  "The unqualified  accountants 
would not have been able to function if not for some of our errant members who are prepared 
to  sign  the  accounts  prepared  by them  without  any question  at  all."   In  1993,  the  MIA 
estimated that there were between 50 and 100 licensed accounting firms collaborating with 
unqualified accountants (NST, 28 Jan. 1993).21
Overall, audit practice in Malaysia during the NEP era was in an uncertain and unsatisfactory 
state. While the MIA remained largely uninfluential, the privately organised MACPA with its 
power limited to only a fraction of the accountants population in the country and controlled by 
the internationally affiliated audit firms whose clients would include foreign investors, was left 
free by the government  to do what  it  felt  was right with hardly any interference or much 
expectation  from the  government.  This  led  to  the  picture  that  financial  reporting  and  the 
related matter of external auditing was largely superfluous in a society where the government 
as the main engine of the economy was not just the regulator but also the so-called user and 
preparer of audited statements   -   except  in cases where there was a need for funds from 
foreigners to invest in the manufacturing sector who thus for one reason or another demanded 
the presence of company audit and thus the external auditor.22  The  events  of  the 
1970s, the May 13th 1969 Tragedy and the subsequent implementation of the NEP  pushed the 
government to get heavily involved in the nation's economy.  In the 1980s, the two economic 
recessions  in  the  first  six  years  of  the  decade  and  the  financial  debacles  of  numerous 
companies including those owned by the government forced the government to turn to the 
private sector to take over its role as the engine of the nation's economy. Therefore, whereas 
growth was previously based on expansionary public expenditure, from the late 1980s onward 
most of the economic growth was to be attributed to private sector activities – with perhaps the 
expected inevitable impacts on the nation’s audit practice.  
Accounting’s Rejuvenation with the End of the NEP?  
There were two economic recessions experienced by the country during the 1980s. The first 
one was mild and took place in 1981-82 when the rest of the world also experienced recession. 
In response, the government embarked on a number of strategies to stimulate the economy 
(Yan,  1994,  p.  314;  Abdullah,  1986).  These  efforts  did  not  bear  much  fruit  when   the 
subsequent  economic  slowdown  in   industrialised  countries  impacted  on  the  then  fragile 
Malaysian  economy.  Thus,  another  recession  took  place  in  1985-86.  This  recession  was 
marked  by  reduction  in  national  income,  government  revenues,  consumer  spending  and 
investment and the worst scenario that the nation  had to face since independence (Mohd.-
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Salleh, 1994, pp. 622-623).  At its wake, the government intensified  efforts to attract foreign 
investors  to  the  country's  manufacturing  sector.  Thus,  almost  all  NEP  requirements  were 
waived for export-oriented manufacturing industries. There was the “de-emphasising” of the 
restructuring prong of the NEP,23 which led to a more liberal treatment of private enterprises, 
especially  direct  foreign  investment,  and  a  softening  stance  towards  restructuring  the 
ownership  of  share  capital  of  companies  and  raising  the  threshold  for  manufacturing 
companies so that they escaped the requirements imposed by  the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) (Zainal-Aznam, 1994, p.  597).  Thus,  the NEP had to some extent,  come to an end 
around this time and not in 1990 as planned in the early 1970s.
With a few facets of the NEP pretty much set aside and the private sector  now 
to assume the role of the engine of the economy, the government began a series of programmes 
to facilitate the expansion of private sector businesses. These included the implementation of 
various  strategies  to  upgrade  the  operation  of  the  KLSE (see  Azham,  1994)  and a  major 
amendment  to  the  Companies  Act  1985  in  the  second  half  of  1980s.   The  former  had 
apparently helped in ensuring the KLSE to grow  by leaps and bound in the late 1980s (see 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and Malaysian Strategic Consultancy Sdn. Bhd., 1992, pp. 28-
29) and also later in the first half of 1990s24. However, the major amendment to the Companies 
Act seems not to have resulted to any significant changes in the manner intended for  audit 
practice  in the country.  The same may be said on the revival of the MIA in 1987.  This and 
more are discussed under the next heading. 
Companies Act’s Amendment.  In 1985, the Companies Act was substantially revised (Sum 
and Wishart, 1989).  Apparently the aim among others is to attract foreigners to invest in the 
country, through placing greater emphasis on the need for those associated with companies to 
be more accountable, and to provide greater protection for minority shareholders, who would 
include these foreigners. The revised Act which became effective from 1 February, 1986 made 
extensive  changes  to  the  existing  Ninth  Schedule  to  incorporate  those  elements  that  are 
regarded as best accounting standards and practices leading towards a much higher disclosure 
level than previously. Where it concerns auditing in particular, the 1985 amendment requires 
for the first time all public accounting firms and  individual partners of such firms to register 
with the Registrar of Companies (ROC).  Each partner is allocated a number that must be cited 
in all audit reports.  In addition, the amendment increases the range of persons excluded from 
acting as auditor.  It appears that the purpose of this provision is to identify and sanction those 
company secretaries operating as auditors (Phenix, 1986, p. 12).  Furthermore, the term of an 
audit  license  is  reduced  from three  to  two  years  and  the  procedure  for  granting  licenses 
overhauled  to  make  it  a  more  effective  method  of  monitoring  and  policing  standards  of 
auditing.  
Finally, an auditor is required to report to the ROC if he or she were to find that 
there has been a breach or non-observance of any provisions of the Act.  The onus is on the 
auditor to justify why he has not reported a breach of the Act to the Registrar. This seems to be 
a major break with the tradition in Malaysian Company Law as it  is  based on the British 
system,  although  it  can  be  found  in  the  corresponding  sections  of  the  Australian  and 
Singaporean Acts.  Failure to report could result in a requirement for the auditor to justify in a 
court of law his or her opinion that the breaches have been otherwise adequately dealt with by 
either one of these two approaches: by a comment about such matter in his or her audit report 
or by bringing the matter to the attention of the company directors.  The fulfilment of either of 
these two approaches ensures that the reporting duty of an auditor to the Registrar is a limited 
one.  Nevertheless, the significance of this requirement is that  Malaysian auditors are now 
provided with a channel to report non-observance of the Act.  Previously, the auditor could 
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only use the audit  report  and by the time the report  was presented to the members  of the 
company, the damage caused by the transgressions might well have been irreparable. Section 
174(8) of the Act also makes it clear that the auditor preparing the report would be protected 
by the law. 
This particular 1985 amendment to the Companies Act 1965 has increased the 
auditor's statutory responsibilities in certain respects but at the same time provided the auditors 
with some additional  protection.   With  or  without  the protection  however,  it  appears  that 
auditors  as  represented  by  the  MIA,  are  not  that  happy  with  the  additional  reporting 
responsibility. This was openly remarked by the MIA president at a seminar. He mentioned 
(Hanafiah, 1990, p. 10): "In recent years this legislative intervention in the area of disclosure of 
certain matters to the regulatory authorities seems to be the trend. It is hoped that the public 
perception  of  the  accountants'  independence  is  not  impaired  as  a  result  of  such  legal 
interference in the accountant-client relationship."
Perhaps more important than whether or not the auditors are happy with the 
additional reporting responsibility concerns the question of whether auditors who show their 
failure to abide with the reporting duty to an external party have in fact been taken to task by 
the authorities through criminal charges of fraud/conspiracy.  At the present time there has 
been no news of such action by the government.  In the early 1990s however,  the then minister 
of domestic trade and consumer affairs  noted the following at a conference after saying that 
auditors had moral and legal responsibilities towards shareholders to report any irregularities 
to  the  authorities  (NST,  29  Jan.  1991):  "My ministry  cannot  implement  and  enforce  the 
relevant laws effectively without the feedback and co-operation from your members.  For your 
information, in the past five years the Registrar of Companies only received two reports under 
this section."  The following year, he said (NST, 17 Dec. 1992): “Auditors are still avoiding 
their responsibilities under the law to report any breach or non-compliance of the Companies 
Act 1965 to the Registrar of Companies."  He also said that although only a handful of such 
reports had been received from the auditors, the ROC's inspection and enforcement work had 
revealed that a lot more companies had failed to comply with the law.  He  warned  auditors 
that  "appropriate  action"  would  be  taken against  those who did  not  carry out  their  duties 
conscientiously. He said that the law - Section 174(8) - had made it clear that an auditor who 
failed to make such report was liable to spend two years in jail and/or pay RM 30,000.  
MIA’s Revival.   Though interviews provided a very confusing picture  of the reasons and 
parties involved in the activation of the MIA (see Azham, 2002), the available documents were 
very clear in stating that it was the government which wanted the MIA to be active so that it 
could play the role of  national accounting body as envisaged by the Accountants Act 1967 
(Akauntan Nasional, July 1992, p. 5; Berita Harian, 13 Jan. 1988).  The exact reasons for the 
MIA  being  activated  and  the  important  role  played  by the  government  in  ensuring  the 
activation were revealed in the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document".  It was stated (pp. 5-6) that 
when the then federal cabinet rejected the MACPA proposal for the merger of the MACPA 
with the MIA,25 the MIA was "directed" by the government to be active. The document went 
on to state that the government did so because of the state of the then accounting profession 
reflected  in  various  financial  scandals  which  resulted  with  a  loss  of  confidence  in  the 
profession among the general public and foreign businessmen.  This document also pointed out 
that the government would like the MIA to be activated due to the proliferation of unqualified 
accountants who had caused the government to incur millions of ringgit of losses as a result of 
falsification of their clients' accounts. 
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Note also that the then Finance Minister on the night before the inaugural AGM 
of the MIA in 1987, had mentioned what appeared to be the goals set by the government for 
the MIA to achieve once it was revived (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec. 1987, p. 8): "As 
the Minister responsible for implementing the Accountants Act it is my hope that members of 
the Institute will make the MIA an effective professional body responsible for looking after 
professional standards, education and training and supervision over the professional conduct of 
members."26  He continued saying that cases of fraud in the corporate and financial sectors in 
the country had raised questions  on the role  played by the auditors.   He pointed  out  that 
auditors owed a professional duty to the investing public to point out any illegal activity in the 
company and come out with appropriate audit reports.  He stressed the following picture of 
what  the government  envisaged for  the  accounting profession:  "As for  the  government,  it 
would like to see an accountancy profession that is capable of providing professional work of 
the highest standard in serving the various needs of the sophisticated business community and 
earning the trust and respect of society."
Though these remarks  point  clearly the role and responsibilities  of the MIA 
after its activation, it is quite difficult to say that overall the MIA in its first decade of being 
active has been successful in fulfilling them.  In fact, it can be argued that the MIA has failed 
to achieve much as a regulator of the profession.  Instead it has been preoccupied with various 
efforts to promote the profession. These and more are discussed next.
Regulatory Failure.  The fact that since the early 1980s white-collar crime in its various forms 
has proliferated in the country is well known (see Koon, 1994).  Right after the MIA was 
activated, it appears that various parties in the country have made their feelings known that 
they would like members of the accounting profession to conduct themselves with professional 
integrity.  Among these speakers, Datuk Paduka (later Tun) Daim Zainuddin and Tun Ismail 
Ali had in fact mentioned the MIA by name as the party to play the required role in this field 
(see endnote number  2).   Indeed,  it  was  none  other  than  the  MIA president  himself  who 
concurred with the idea of the important role to be played by the MIA in this matter. On the 
night  before  the  MIA's  first  AGM  in  1987,  the  MIA  president  mentioned  what  he  has 
continued to repeat over the next three years: the MIA aims to be a strong regulatory body (see 
MIA 1988 Annual  Report,  p.  6;  MIA 1989 Annual  Report,  p.  7;  Hanafiah,  1990,  p.  15). 
Specifically on that night of 1987, he said (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec 1987, p. 10):  
Speaking of image, the Institute must endeavour to restore the credibility the profession has 
lost in the eyes of the public.  Several corporate failures such as the recent co-operative 
scandal can be attributed to apparent audit failures.  These must be pursued and investigated 
by the Institute in order to discipline those members who have been negligent and to clear 
the names of those who have not been negligent.  Only the MIA can do this as it has been 
endowed with such disciplinary powers encompassing the whole profession under the Act.  
He stressed that after the inaugural AGM when the MIA was then able to establish/create its 
investigation and disciplinary committees, that the council would have to make "a determined 
effort" to clean up the image of the profession.  The MIA president even mentioned that to 
ensure a more effective policing by the MIA in the future, there would be a  joint investigation 
and disciplinary body comprising representatives from the Treasury, Registrar of Companies 
and Registrar of Cooperatives. He  also volunteered to have the MIA  take over the "policing" 
task over the auditors handled by "a monitoring committee" in the Finance Ministry.
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With this apparent early desire to be a strong regulator, a few months after the MIA first AGM, 
The Malay Mail  (13 Jan.  1988) reported that  following complaints  against  15 accountants 
lodged by companies, fellow accountants and government departments. The MIA was going 
all out to clean up the act of errant accountants.  The MIA president was reported to have said 
that 15 accountants were under investigation for alleged malpractice and criminal breach of 
trust.   He also said that  the accountants  faced being de-registered while court  prosecution 
awaited those who had violated the Accountants Act 1967.  And in 1988 and early 1989, there 
were a number of reports in the NST on what the MIA leaders would do to errant members. 
The headlines of the news reports said all:  "MIA May Expel Members Who Break the Rules" 
(21 June 1988); "MIA Warns Members of Stern Action"  (15 July 1988); "MIA May Expel 
Those Abetting Fraud" (17 Oct. 1988); "MIA to Haul Up Accountants Not Following Rules" 
(28  Feb.  1989).   Also  on  14  July  1988,  reports  with  the  following  headlines  appeared: 
"Warning from the MIA" (Business Times) and "MIA to Get Rid of Black Sheep" (The Star). 
In the former, the MIA president was reported as saying that the MIA would not condone 
members who "... persistently refuse to comply with the statutory requirements, accounting and 
auditing standards adopted by the Institute." 
However later after the MIA's code of ethics was made effective in April 1990, 
hardly anything like those stated above had come out from the MIA.27  And if a check were to 
be made of the MIA Annual Reports over the years, one would discover that since the first 
AGM in September 1987 until the AGM in 1996, the MIA's disciplinary committees had only 
taken disciplinary actions against members for the years 1987/88, 1991 and 1992.  In other 
words, in the later years after its activation, it appears that the MIA had not found it "fit" to 
discipline  any  members  where  complaints  were  filed  against.  Specifically,  for  the  years 
1987/88, 1991 and 1992, four members were disciplined by the MIA each year for a total of 12 
members in its first ten years of active life.28  Between 1993 and up till  the AGM in 1996, it 
had  failed  to  impose  disciplinary  actions  against  its  members  although  the  MIA Annual 
Reports showed that “every year” since 1987 (except for the years 1989 and 1990 when not 
much details were disclosed in the MIA Annual Reports on the works done by its investigative 
and disciplinary committees29) the total number of cases investigated, under review or pending 
had in fact reached 25 (1996), 30 (1995), 25 (1994), "more than ten" (1993), 29 (1992), 28 
(1991), 39 (1990) and 23 (1987/88).
Related to the topic of failing to ensure that its members are in fact doing a 
better job as accountants or auditors and that necessary actions are taken against the errant 
ones, the MIA has also failed to implement the very ideas that its leaders themselves claimed 
needed to be put into action in order to strengthen the nation's audit practice. One of these 
ideas concerned the practice of quality review of  audit firms. The MIA 1992 Annual Report 
(p. 7),  Mingguan Malaysia (12 Apr. 1992),  Akauntan Nasional (May 1992, p. 26; Nov/Dec. 
1992. p. 31; June 1993, p. 22), NST  (28 July 1992) and finally the MIA 1993 Annual Report 
(p. 15) provided evidence of  the MIA leaders giving glowing details of the need for a quality 
review  programme.   Interviews  with  a  number  of  the  MIA council  members   produced 
conflicting stories on why the MIA had failed to implement it.  Another area that the MIA had 
failed to put into action is concerned with its various proposals in 1992 related to the subject of 
the  auditor's  independence  which  the  MIA  president  claimed  "ought"  to  have   been 
implemented with a few other measures to strengthen the profession  (Akauntan Nasional -  
Conference Times, 15 July 1992, p. 1;  Business Times, 15 July 1992). It is worth noting the 
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following remark that he made when talking about the various proposals (Akauntan Nasional, 
15 July 1992): "There is no strong financial centre in the world that is not supported by a 
strong and well developed accountancy profession.  Therefore now is the time for action. Now 
is the time for us to develop ourselves and to give our profession a lift."
Also, in at least one case the MIA had appeared to under perform  as compared 
to  its  earlier/previous  fine  efforts.   This  is  concerned  with  the  Continuing  Professional 
Development (CPD) that was made effective from 1 March 1992 (Akauntan Nasional, March 
1992,  p.  22).  See  the  Akauntan  Nasional   (Nov.  1990,  p.  20),  NST  (6  Nov.  1990)  and 
Akauntan Nasional   (Nov/Dec 1992, pp. 30-31) where the MIA president stressed why the 
MIA needed to have the CPD made compulsory.  However the MIA 1995 Annual Report (p. 
26) disclosed that "changes" that had been introduced in November 1994 and made effective 
from 1 January, 1995 ensured that what took place in the past, where the MIA secretariat was 
the entity responsible for CPD record-keeping, had been  replaced with members themselves 
being made responsible to do the record-keeping individually.   There was no longer any need 
for each member to submit  an annual CPD report  in a prescribed form.  Instead,  members 
would be selected at random and asked to produce evidence of compliance.  
Successful Promoter.  After its activation, the MIA had shown the tendency to  promote the 
interest  of  its  members  in  a  number  of  ways.  In  October  1988,  the  MIA  submitted  a 
memorandum to the Finance Minister requesting that the government  look into the desirability 
and possible methods of limiting the accountant's personal liability for negligence claims. 
The government did not bother to respond to this MIA's proposal.  As if the government's 
indifference was not  embarrassing enough, and notwithstanding the apparent  positive state 
experienced by local auditors, the MIA had also on 30 January, 1991 launched a professional 
indemnity insurance scheme for its practising members (Akauntan Nasional, July 1992, p. 6). 
But the MIA had failed to get good response from its practising members. After nine months, 
only 10 percent of the some 800-member firms had signed up (NST, 30 Sept. 1991). Thus, the 
MIA president said that the MIA council would have to consider making it mandatory for all 
member firms to be covered by the scheme (NST, 19 Oct. 1991).  
 
The MIA in what appeared to be an all out effort to protect its members' public 
accounting  activities  had  also  started  early  in  1988  a  fight  against  the 
unqualified/unregistered accountants.  From February to November 1988, the MIA resorted 
to  lodging  police reports and at times the MIA senior staff members would join the police to 
raid the premises of these unqualified accountants.  The MIA also hired lawyers to bring the 
matter to court.  By the end of 1988, MIA had lodged 92 police reports and the police had 
raided 19 firms (NST, 5 Nov. 1988).  This approach taken by the MIA received a certain level 
of condemnation from various parties.  For example, the Editorial to the  Business Times (5 
March 1988) had noted the following: "Until MIA comes out with its own examinations to 
allow these unregistered accountants to gain local recognition too, it  is argued that such a 
tough stance may not be entirely fair." The crackdown ended when the Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate  Secretaries  and Administrators  (MICSA) representing  unregistered accountants 
sent a letter of appeal to the then Finance Minister for a review of the actions taken by the 
MIA (NST, 5 Nov. 1988). Later in 1992, the MIA launched the Malaysian Association of 
Accounting Technicians  (MAAT) to  house most  of these accountants  -  a move that  with 
hindsight did not need the MIA to initiate such a crackdown in the first place.  That was 
precisely what the MIA president claimed in 1989.  He said (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, 
p. 24): "... with the benefit of hindsight and the number of bogus accountants involved - which 
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is estimated at some 3,000 - the Institute should have formed the proposed Malaysian Institute 
of Accounting Technicians (MAAT) first." 
Finally,  the MIA in promoting the accounting profession had also proposed 
institutionalising its minimum audit fees schedule (see MIA Council, 1994).  The new ruling 
that governed all MIA practising members was supposed to be effective from 1 January 1992 
(Akauntan Nasional, Feb. 1992, p. 19), but it  was later moved to 1 April 1993 (Akauntan 
Nasional,  May 1993,  p.  16).   At  the  end  it  was  turned  into  a  mere  "guideline"  as  of  1 
September, 1994. This was because as soon as the minimum fees schedule was implemented, 
the uproar began. The Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce president suggested that  the 
MIA defer its proposal to implement its minimum audit fees schedule on 1 April, 1993 (NST, 
17 Feb. 1993).   He claimed that the MIA minimum audit fees were too high and unfair and 
would be a burden for small and medium businesses.  He stressed that the government should 
amend the Accountants Act of 1967 to prevent such exploitation of small businesses by the 
MIA.   The  following  year,  the  Federation  of  Malaysian  Manufacturers  (FMM)  issued  a 
statement urging the MIA to review the audit fees schedule (NST, 18 Feb. 1994).  The final 
showdown  took  place  on  19  January,  1994  when  the  Associated  Chinese  Chamber  of 
Commerce  and  Industry Malaysia  (ACCCIM),  the  FMM and  the  MIA plus  a  few other 
interested parties met the domestic trade and consumer affairs ministry officials including the 
ministry's secretary-general to discuss the new fees structure (NST, 11 Feb. 1994).  A few 
months  after  this  meeting,  the  MIA  president  announced  that  the  MIA  would  drop  its 
minimum scale of audit fees effective as from 1 September, 1994 and instead maintain it as a 
guide for its practising members (NST, 2 Aug. 1994).  
It  would  not  be  considered  an  exaggeration  to  say that  the  MIA after  its 
activation, did not seem to provide much confidence that it was able to regulate itself well. 
This seems to illustrate what Friedland (1989, p. 74) says to be "the tremendous reluctance" 
across accounting professional bodies in the Far East to prosecute their members.  The MIA 
had also failed to implement certain projects that its own leaders argued were necessary for 
strengthening the nation's audit practice.  As if these were not disturbing enough, the MIA in 
the related field of increasing the number of qualified accountants/auditors, had shown that its 
conducts had left much room for improvement.30
All in all, the MIA during the ten year period following its activation in 1987 
had largely failed to provide much confidence in its role as audit regulator. Unfortunately, the 
authorities  did  not  seem to  do much to  help improve  matters.   From several  documented 
sources, it seems that the government was not happy with the MIA during the first few years 
after its activation and had in fact initiated some actions but never really implemented those 
actions.  The  government's  half-hearted  reaction  to  the  MIA's  self-regulatory  failure  in 
particular and the quagmire in the profession in general may be reflected in speeches delivered 
by the  then  Deputy Finance  Minister  Loke Yuen Yow in  July 1988 (as  can  be  found in 
Appendix 12 in the "MIA 1988 Bounded Document") and later in 1990 (Akauntan Nasional, 
Oct. 1990, p. 21) and also in the speech by the then Finance Minister, Tun Daim Zainuddin, in 
September 1989 (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, pp. 21-23).  
After  the Finance Minister  stepped down in  1991,  it  seemed that  not  much 
could perhaps be expected from his successor. As a whole, the person who replaced him and 
who had also held the post of deputy prime minister had not been critical of the performance of 
the MIA as a regulator. In fact, he seemed to have a high regard for Malaysia's audit firms and 
the related standard of financial reporting of Malaysian companies (see  Akauntan Nasional, 
Sept/Oct 1991, p. 23;  The Malaysian Accountant, June 1994, p. 14). From the time he took 
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over from Tun Daim Zainuddin, only once - in the very year when he assumed the post -  was 
he critical of the audit executed by local auditors. At the 7th National Accountants Conference, 
he mentioned that the government viewed the lack of credibility of the auditors as a serious 
matter  since  many  auditors  had  followed  the  instruction  of   company  directors  or  top 
management of the companies in ensuring that the financial statements reflected a misleading 
picture of the company affairs (Utusan Malaysia, 19 Sept. 1991).  
It may be safe to say that the economic recessions of the 1980s had to some 
extent disrupted the pre-existing political, corporate and financial systems in Malaysia.  It had 
also created a perceived need for "structural" (as oppose to in-depth) changes to the audit 
system.  The fact that changes in the audit process focus more on form or appearance but not 
so much on substance, had ensured that not much could perhaps be expected from  auditors 
and their representative accounting body, the MIA. The next section attempts to address the 
issue of  why Malaysia has been so unfortunate in the audit arena.  
Towards Understanding Audit in Malaysia 
The objective of this section of the paper is to explain the distinctive audit phenomenon in 
Malaysia by tracing the historical development of the audit function from 1957 to 1997 and 
analysing   environmental  influences  on  this  development.  In  the  previous  section,  the 
delineation of what took place in the audit arena over the forty year period was  divided into 
three parts.  These three parts may now be condensed into two eras namely: pre-NEP and NEP 
Plus. Both periods have provided evidence of the relevance of the theory of political economy 
of accounting.  
Audit During the Pre-NEP era.  During the pre-NEP era, the passing of the Companies Act 
of 1965 and the Accountants Act of 1967 appeared to signify that the economy was being set 
up to operate under a laissez-faire kind of environment by the government - with the assistance 
of the private sector as shown by the formation of the MACPA in 1958.  The authorities and 
other parties made the necessary moves of ensuring that existing foreign investments stayed 
put and providing for much more investment to flow in through the manufacturing sector.  The 
Parliamentary Debates (Vol. II, no. 8, Col. 1558 dated 9 Aug. 1965) stated specifically that 
the  Companies  Act  1965  had  two  objectives:  to  protect  investors  and  to  attract  “foreign 
investors”  into  the  country.    Specifically,  it  was  in  the  interest  of  foreigners  who  were 
shareholders and bankers  to  the merchant  agency houses that  the right  audit  infrastructure 
needed to be in place.  
 
With  the  eruption  of  violence  between  Malays  and  Chinese  in  1969,  the 
Malaysian economy witnessed a change in direction away from a full free enterprise economy 
to that spearheaded by the government.   Even after the NEP era was supposed to have come to 
an end in 1990, the nation’s economy remained  much in the hands of the government or those 
who were closely associated with it.  As a  consequence, the picture that emerged showed that 
to a very large extent, audits had little rationale for existence.  In other words, the sorry picture 
of the audit from the 1970s onward provides evidence of the minimal value placed on auditing 
in the Malaysian society.  To paraphrase Hopper et al. (1987), auditing development has been 
implicated in the broader ideological and political struggles within the society.  
Audit in  the NEP Plus Era.   From the early 1970s with the launching of the NEP until 
perhaps  the  mid-1980s  when the  government  was  forced  to  redress   the  NEP due  to  the 
occurrence of the 1985-86 economic recession, the one word perhaps best  able to describe the 
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audit practice was its apparent "neglect" by  political executives. During this period, with the 
MACPA thriving and the presence of the audit section in the Companies Act, it appears that 
the nation’s leaders saw no further need to focus on the audit system.  Examination of what 
took place within the audit arena whereby the accounting statutory body MIA was left inactive 
leading to a number of negative repercussions demonstrates a lack of concern for ensuring that 
the audit  and related areas should function appropriately by those parties involved in their 
administration. 
This could possibly be due to the direct access to internal financial information 
and to the corporations' directors by those who were from the government side who  now also 
played the role of shareholders. Such access subverted any strong demand for a truly functional 
audit and related matters. The direct and indirect access to information apparently reduced a 
potential  for  agency problems  except  for  those  deemed  to  be  outsiders.  But  when  these 
outsiders  were  mainly  speculative  investors,  they  appeared  to  show  that  they  “accepted” 
information asymmetries.  
The authorities might  also have failed to improve upon the audit function due 
to the fact that they did not want  accounting practitioners to make their life unnecessarily 
difficult given the "underhand" acts that they committed (or had to commit) to ensure the goals 
of NEP (and/or "their own") were fulfilled at "whatever" price. This very point was made clear 
by the leader of Aliran, the NGO for "freedom, justice and solidarity" in Malaysia, Chandra 
Muzaffar when he tried to explain the reluctance of national leaders to take action against 
those responsible for corrupt activities (Chandra, 1989, p. 99).31  He wrote: "To expose their 
misdemeanours  would  be  to  expose  the  New Economic  Policy's  not  so  subtly  concealed 
agenda of creating Malay capitalists, whatever the costs and the consequences.  Ethics have to 
be set aside for the time being - so it has been argued in certain official circles - to facilitate the 
rapid growth of a Malay capitalist class."
Overall,  audit  in  Malaysia  during  the  NEP  era  was  in  an  unstable  and 
unsatisfactory state. Unfortunately, the situation did not really improve  even after the NEP 
came to an unofficial end in 1985.  Although this time period saw the revival of the MIA in 
1987 and the Companies Act 1965 heavily amended in 1985 resulting in additional duties and 
responsibilities for accountants and auditors, the audit transformation might be safely said to 
be superficial. Specifically, the actions of MIA in the regulatory field and the implementation 
of  the  auditors’  ROC  reporting  duty  under  the  amended  Companies  Act  were  below 
expectations. And yet there did not seem to be any decisive efforts on the part of those with the 
power and authority to see that these were improved.32 
It is a fact that for auditing to reach its potential,  transparency in conduct, and a 
situation  in  which  those  making  decisions  can  be  held  accountable  is  required.  All  these 
requirements did not fit the Malaysian environment as succinctly described in mid-1997 by the 
Editorial to the NST  (7 June 1997): 
At the pace of its economic growth, Malaysia, too will feel the vice of corruption sooner or 
later. Like others before it, this country will also try to look the other way, and do as much 
as it can to avoid rocking the economic boat.  Like their Asian peers, politicians will trust to 
the moral superiority of a few good men to keep the others in line.  And there is always the 
argument against  washing dirty linen in public, the stubborn loyalty of politicians to their 
compatriots,  and an equally obstinate  belief that  corruption is  confined to  an indiscreet 
minority.  In politics, hard choices require courage and often pose uncertain risks  - which 
is why politicians will try to postpone them until their hands are forced.  The instinct of 
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self-preservation will usually urge politicians to control the damage done by disclosures of 
corruption, rather than attempt to root it out.  (Emphasis added.)
There were six reasons (in italics) disclosed by the Editorial as to why corruption could be 
considered  to  have  gone  unhampered,  and  as  disclosed  by  the  Anti-Corruption  Agency, 
corruption had been on the rise over the last 20 years and tougher punishments were needed 
(New Sunday Times,  8 June 1997). The people could not perhaps expect  much from their 
accountants and auditors when their elected leaders did not seem to think that it  was their 
responsibility  to  ensure  that  their  "compatriots"  were  really  conducting  themselves  with 
integrity.  For one reason or  another,   leaders  acted with  much leniency ensuring cases  of 
corruption  were  swept  under  the  carpet,  and  the  auditors  who  might  have  incurred  audit 
failures  could expect  in  turn that  they would be able  to go scot-free everytime a business 
collapsed and financial scandal erupted.33  
Specifically, in Malaysia, the MIA although it  was revived in 1987, was not 
expected to emerge as a strong accounting body able to play the required role in confronting 
cases of corruption, nepotism and patron-clientelism that had been plaguing the country for 
many decades but particularly in the few years prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis 
in 1997.  In short, it was in the interest of certain sections in the Malaysian society to see a 
malfunctioning  audit  marked  by  an  incapable  accounting  professional  body  and  a  weak 
enforcement of a company law section on auditor’s reporting duty to ROC. Therefore, while 
the MIA council members appeared to be ineffective and those overseeing the audit related 
sections of amended Companies Act had failed to play their role, others with the power to 
make corrections had not translated their words into actions.
This failure by the power elite  to take the appropriate actions could also be 
traced  to  the  case  of  the  MIA-MACPA rivalry and that  of  the  enforcement  of  Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) standards. Details of these two cases may be found in 
Azham  (2002).  See  also  Susela  (1999).  Briefly,  on  the  former,  the  series  of  public 
disagreements between leaders of the MIA and MACPA had failed to force the authorities to 
make a stance as to which body they  saw as the leader of the nation’s accounting profession 
(Malaysian Business, 16 Aug. 1988, p. 19; Malaysian Business, 1 Aug. 1996, p. 1).  As for the 
latter, the establishment of the MASB by the government in mid-1997 to take over from the 
MIA the  responsibility  of  setting  accounting  standards  had  failed  in  ensuring  that  it  was 
equipped  with  the  power  of  enforcement  –  though  early  on  in  1994  (The  Malaysian 
Accountant, June 1994, pp. 14-15) and later in the following year the then Finance Minister in 
his 1996 budget speech (NST,  28 Oct.  1995) did mention such a need.  The failure to act 
accordingly could  only mean  that  those  with  power  were  not  really serious  in  seeing  the 
emergence of a well-respected accounting profession and high quality financial reports. 
  
For what appears to be an act of “too little too late” coming from the authorities, 
just several months before the country was dragged into the quagmire of the Asian Financial 
Crisis  1997-98,  the  ROC was reported  to  have sent  its  few officers  scurrying around the 
country to check audit working papers of audit firms (Business Times, 21 Feb. 1997). The fact 
that this activity by the ROC which had never been conducted before (as found in an interview 
with the Companies’ Registrar himself) happened to coincide with the efforts conducted by 
yours truly (to interview personalities such as the former finance minister Tun Daim Zainuddin 
and the Companies’ Registrar) had led yours truly to conclude that there was more to this 
action of the ROC than what met the eye.   These accountants were supposed to complete their 
task at the end of the year.  However, there did not appear to be any reported news on the 
outcome of their operation till  later during the following year.34 In the interview conducted 
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with the Companies’ Registrar, he  stated that the investigations had uncovered that some of 
the complaints that he received from various parties including shareholders on the "correctness 
of accounts" and "quality of auditing" were found to be valid.  Furthermore, he said that it had 
been found that the MIA "had not carried out the task of regulating its members to the ROC's 
satisfaction".
Capitalism per se does not require external audit.  This is especially the case 
when the capitalism one refers to is the cooperative, insider or crony type (see Kunio, 1988). 
The so-called independent audit is an antithesis to such economy.  Thus, in Malaysia, one may 
find evidence where what may be considered a cornerstone for external audit is downplayed by 
those who should know better.  In an interview which took place in 1988, Datuk Mohamad of 
the audit firm Hanafiah, Raslan and Mohamad (HRM) mentioned what took place in 1964, 
"when  all  the  large  accountancy practices  in  the  country were  owned  and  dominated  by 
foreigners" (Malaysian Business, 16 Aug. 1988, p. 13): "The late Tun Razak (who was then 
the deputy prime minister  and later prime minister) called the three of us [he and his two 
colleagues] in one day and said: 'Why don't you guys set up a local auditing firm?  At least try. 
If  you can't make it, we'll take you back'."  Next he was quoted as saying: "It was a difficult 
decision to make .... [b]ut we were lucky to receive a lot of assistance from Tun Razak.  Right 
from  the  beginning,  big  clients  like  the  National  Electricity  Board  (NEB),  the  Police 
Cooperative,  the Social  Welfare Department and many government-related statutory bodies 
had their accounts audited by us."  When the 1970s arrived with the government playing  a 
much bigger role in the economy, HRM being the only "Bumiputra accounting firm" around 
was hired to audit the burgeoning number of public enterprises and other government entities. 
Note also that when it concerned the local Chinese auditors, the MIA's official 
journal,  Akauntan Nasional (Dec. 1990, p. 18), had reported how some MIA members "with 
small practice" were having difficulty with the newly issued MIA Code of Ethics related to the 
need for auditors to be independent. As a result, the chairman of the MIA's Ethics Committee, 
Khoo Eng Choo, noted the following (Akauntan Nasional, Dec. 1990, p. 18): “The Committee 
is more concerned with the auditors of public listed companies rather than with auditors of 
family companies.”
All in all, in the absence of widespread stock ownership and less than a free 
market to allocate resources, monitoring of management operations can perhaps be provided 
by other methods which differ from external audits. Probably in Malaysia that has always been 
the case – though to what extent  such monitoring is done professionally is anyone’s guess. 
Thus, by the time the nation experienced the damage brought about by the Asian Financial 
Crisis  1997-97, audit  in Malaysia could hardly be regarded as an intrinsic and constitutive 
component of the government of economic life.  In other words, its presence to a good extent 
was devoid of meaning.  Not surprisingly, the nation’s audit arena was filled with lost hope 
and utter neglect.  Just another story of the triumph of hope over experience that Malaysians 
are so used to.   
Conclusions 
Although there have been numerous studies such as those by Enthoven (1977, 1973) on the 
role of accounting in economic development  and others such as the effect  of international 
transfer of accounting skills (Seidler, 1967; Needles, 1976), accounting is constantly seen as a 
technical  activity  which  provides  financial  information  for  economic  development.  The 
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scholarly works are invariably normative and are deemed located in the functionalist paradigm. 
Thus, they fail to examine how accounting is very much a reflection of the society it is located 
in. There always appears to be a lack of attention to developing countries' socio-economic 
factors which impact upon accounting resulting in/to suggestions that the transfer of Western 
accounting technologies and ideas would be unproblematic and undeniably and automatically 
beneficial to these countries  - though experience time and again appears to prove otherwise.
    
The  use  of  the  theory of  political  economy in  this  paper  in  explaining  the 
rationale for auditing in Malaysia should help  address the issue of  lack of accounting studies 
in developing countries where accounting is regarded as a part of the wider socio-economic 
and political context. In other words, in the very notion of accounting propagated by Burchell 
et al. (1985) where the accounting processes and institutions are not so much influenced by the 
wider social, economic and political environments as "inter-twined" with them, and thus, as 
proposed by Hopper and Powell (1985, p. 93), need to be studied together. 
The  Malaysian  audit  story  covering  a  period  of  the  first  forty  years  after 
independence in 1957, has provided evidence of the character of auditing as a social activity 
within a specific network of changeable social relations.  It is embedded in its social, economic 
and political context.  Time and again, factors surrounding audit have had an impact on the 
audit process itself.  Audit in Malaysia therefore cannot be interpreted  simply as a technical 
phenomenon residing outside the social domain.  
From a  practice  originating  as  a  consequence  of  the  need  perceived  by the 
national leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s to maintain the status quo in the nation’s modern 
economy, following the launching of the NEP in early 1970s, the function of auditing in the 
Malaysian society was in most cases devoid of any essence of mission; instead, it was created, 
shaped and changed by the pressures which gave rise to its development over time. The role 
that it  served was intertwined in the contexts in which it  operated.  As has been noted by 
Hopper et al. (1987), accounting development has been implicated in broader ideological and 
political struggles in the society.
The basic structural purpose of the audit  in Malaysia as presented in several 
authoritative sources such as Company Law is really nothing more than to provide the "image" 
of a modern economy to attract investments from overseas. It is a kind of representation that is 
not  supported  by  reality on the basis  of  much of  the  nation's  history after  independence. 
Specifically, the changes occurring in the audit system since the first half of 1980s onwards 
were more ephemeral than real, structural rather than in-depth.  In other words, pressure for 
change was related directly to the creation of the modern audit infrastructure, and not to the 
need for its effective and appropriate administration in the Malaysian social environment.  This 
is perhaps understandable since very little actually changed in the manner that political and 
economic power were distributed among members of Malaysian society and in the context of 
the so-called change from a predominantly command-economic system in the 1970s to a more 
capital-market economic system in the late 1980s and beyond.
All in all, it appears that the process of auditing was affected by certain groups 
who possessed  special  interests.  These parties  had made  it  certain  for  audit  to  operate  in 
congruence with their expectations and objectives.   If changes were to take place, they would 
be mobilised in the pursuit of their vested interests.  Armstrong (1985, 1987), Hopper  et al. 
(1987), Lehman and Tinker (1987), Loft (1986), Miller and O'Leary (1987) to mention a few 
have stressed this very point. Notwithstanding their rhetoric, it may safely be said that they had 
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little interest in seeing changes in the status quo.  As Rohwer (1995, p. 281) in his acclaimed 
work  on  the  rising  of  East  Asian  nations  had  noted,  "...  elites  do  not  normally  reform 
themselves or do things to threaten their own position".  
Overall, audit in Malaysia prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-
98  was  in  an  uncertain  and  unsatisfactory state  –  similar  to  those  found  in  other  Asian 
countries such as the Philippines (Dyball and Valcarcel, 1999) and Japan (Sakagami  et al., 
1999). It was clearly influenced by the broader context in which it was embedded.  It was the 
result  of  historical  events  which,  on  the  face  of  vested  interests  and  distinctive  social, 
economic and political attributes, had failed to ensure that its existence in recent years would 
really make a huge difference to the pre-existing arrangement  which emerged in the early 
1970s with the launching of the NEP. 
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1Contact author : Azham Md. Ali, Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Utara Malaysia, azham@uum.edu.my
2See remarks made by the then chairman of the Securities Commission (SC) (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct/Dec 1993, p. 15), 
the Finance Minister (Akauntan Nasional, Sept. 1989, pp. 21-23; Aug. 1990, p. 26; Oct. 1990, pp. 20-21) and those by Tun 
Ismail Ali, the former Governor of Central Bank and the chairman of the Bumiputra trust agency, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB), and several listed companies (The Malaysian Accountant, July-Sept 1988, p. 18). 
3Just before the Companies Act 1965 came into force, in 1965, the audit firm Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. located in Kuala 
Lumpur was sued by plaintiffs who were shareholders of a company  - Kiwi Dry Cleaners Ltd. - at the High Court of Malaya  
(Civil Suit No. 324 of 1965 Kuala Lumpur).  See (1967) 1 MLJ 87. (MLJ stands for Malayan Law Journal.)
4From hereon it is referred to as NST.    
5For example,  as noted Malaysian Medical  Council  chairman Professor  Datuk Dr Mahmood Mohd Noor,  "[t]he number of 
medical negligence or malpractice suits in Malaysia is relatively few but the cases filed over the last two years were more than 
the average for the previous five years" (NST, 29 Dec. 1994).  As a result, it is reported that the Law Ministry is now looking into 
ways to introduce limits on the amount of money a plaintiff can claim (NST, 29 Dec. 1993).
6This view of his was however different to that of the former, for Oh Chong Peng (1989) did say that some amount of pressure for 
change had been dispensed by regulatory authorities like the Capital Issues Committee (which was replaced by the Securities 
Commission in 1992) and the Central Bank.
7Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu was criticised by a Hong Kong inspector over audits it conducted for a group of companies which 
were  under  criminal  investigation  (International  Accounting  Bulletin,  8  Nov  1993,  p.  1).   The  firm was  alleged  to  have 
committed audit failure leading to the publication of misleading financial statements. In  Singapore, the collapse of Pan-El, a 
property, salvage and hotel group, resulted in an unprecedented three-day closure of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore stock 
exchanges in December 1985, the demise of six broking firms and the trial of three key figures in the Pan-El Group on charges 
ranging from criminal breach of trust to share forgery (NST, 6 June 1988).  The uproar over the alleged failure of the auditors to 
conduct proper audits was brought to public attention in late 1986 when the Singapore Minister of Finance mentioned in his 
speech in Parliament that there was "an inexplicable audit failure" in the Pan-El affair. The following year, the investigation 
undertaken by the Singapore Society of Accountants (SSA) culminated with Coopers & Lybrand publicly reprimanded for the 
quality of its audit work.  As for South Korea, in 1993, the country's Securities Supervisory Board (SSB), which regulates the 
nation's audit practice, issued warnings to seven of South Korea's audit firms for their alleged audit negligence (International  
Accounting Bulletin, 17 Jan. 1994, p. 4). This warning took place after SSB conducted a quality review of auditing practice of 
selected firms.  Out of the seven firms warned, four were affiliates of the Big Six (now Big Four).  Finally, in the case of India, as 
a result of the loss of US$1.5 billion through a securities fraud involving banks and mutual funds, the auditors were criticised by 
a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) set up by the Parliament to investigate the case (International Accounting Bulletin, 14 
March 1994, p. 3). Not surprisingly, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1993 dropped from its list of auditors for 1992/3 about 
20 audit firms which acted as auditors for the institutions involved during the 1991/2 fiscal year  (International Accounting  
Bulletin, 21 June 1993, p. 2).  These firms which included all the Big Six were ordered to take a one year  "period of rest". 
8For South Korea, in December 1991, alleged failure of the auditors to uncover significant liabilities of now bankrupt companies 
had led to the investors filing the first ever lawsuit against the auditors (International Accounting Bulletin, Feb. 1992, p. 3). As 
for Singapore, in 1988, the former shareholders of Pan-El sued its group auditor, Coopers & Lybrand, for US$105 million (NST, 
6 June 1988). It perhaps needs to be noted too that early on in December 1987, a former partner of another accounting firm, 
acting as auditor for a number of Pan-El's subsidiaries, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge brought against him for issuing a 
misleading audit report.  He was sentenced to two months in jail and fined for S$10,000. 
9Note that Dahl (1967) defines power and conflict as the ability to impose one's will upon another and the existence of more than 
one interest, respectively.
10Dye (1986) argues that a cohesive "power elite" exercise authority over a variety of institutions.  This elite is comprised of a 
small group of dominant, authoritative individuals or entities.  The elite functions through, among other things, interlocking 
directorships, interlocking institutional experiences and similar social backgrounds.  However, instead of a single power elite, 
Dye says that a society may have different groups of individuals or entities which exercise power in its various sectors. Thus, 
leadership or authority is dispersed.  More importantly perhaps it is not unusual for these elites to be in conflict with each other.
11Previously in the Federation of Malaya, company law was governed by the Companies Ordinance 1946, whilst in the State of 
Singapore, it was governed by the Straits Settlements Ordinance 1940. The Sarawak Companies Ordinance was similar to the 
North Borneo Companies Ordinance, which was based on Hong Kong companies legislation which in turn was modelled from 
the English Companies Act of 1929.
12Note however that in the Parliamentary Debates  (Vol. II, no. 8, Col. 1558 and dated 9 Aug. 1965), it  was stated by the then 
Minister of Commerce and Industry, Dr. Lim Swee Aun, that the committee with the responsibility to draft the Companies Bill 
(whose chairman came from the ministry of commerce and industry and with the assistance of John Finemore, a Colombo Plan 
draftsman from Australia) had considered not only the present legislation in force in the UK, Australia, India and New Zealand 
but also the draft code prepared for Ghana by Professor Gower and the reports presented in the UK by the committees chaired by 
Lord Cohen and Lord Jenkin.
13The MIA president mentioned in 1987 that the power to issue audit and liquidator licenses had been delegated in accordance 
with Section 8(7) of the Companies Act 1965, to a committee in the finance ministry (The Malaysian Accountant, Oct-Dec 1987, 
p. 10).  He did not say however when this committee had actually started its operation. 
14The public and registered members are those with accounting bachelor or post-graduate diploma degrees from local higher 
institutions or accounting professional qualifications from MIA's recognised local and overseas accounting bodies.  To become a 
member, he or she also needed to have three to five years relevant experience in public accounting firms for public accountants 
and in commerce/industry/public sector entity for registered accountants. (Five years are the rule.  But it will be shortened to four 
years for those with High School Certificate and to three years for those graduating with degrees or diploma from local higher 
institutions.) The recognised accounting bodies (as listed in the Accountants Act’s First Schedule) are the Chartered Institutes of 
Scotland, England and Wales, Ireland, Australia, Canada and India; the Societies of Accountants of Australia and New Zealand; 
the  Association  of  Certified  Accountants  (UK);  the  Institute  of  Cost  and  Management  Accountants  (UK);  and  Malaysian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA).  As for the licensed accountants, they do not have MIA recognised 
accounting qualifications but are allowed to practice for either one of the following two reasons: they are already in operation as 
accountants, tax-consultants or tax advisers prior to the passing of the Accountants Act in 1967; the finance minister has granted 
them limited approval to act as company auditor under Section 8(6) of the Companies Act 1965.
15The Act however with regard to a tax consultant or a tax adviser has a provision allowing him or her to practice or hold 
him/herself out as one when he or she has the authority to do so as granted by any other law that is enforced within the country.
16As defined by Peng (1979, p. 193) to be the ratio between net fixed investment and net profits.
17The unofficial estimate of the total dead however was as high as six or seven hundred. The riots took place in the aftermath of 
the May 1969 general election when the Chinese-dominated opposition parties registered impressive gains at the polls.  They 
celebrated  their  victory  by  taunting  the  Malays  on  Malay  areas  of  Kuala  Lumpur.  The  Malays  in  turn  organised 
counterdemonstrations which moved into Chinese quarters. With insults exchanged on the streets, rioting ensued (see Bass, 1973; 
Parker, 1973; Chee, 1971; Teik, 1971; and National Operations Council, 1969). 
18He was among the first few Bumiputra sent to Australia under the Colombo Plan to study Accounting (Business Times, 17 Aug. 
1989).  He qualified  as  a  Chartered  Accountant  in  1960  after  five  years  with Price  Waterhouse  in  Melbourne.   Upon his 
retirement in 1989, he took over the business of the audit firm Baharom-Jasani (Business Times, 17 Aug. 1989).  In 1991, it was 
reported (The Star, 10 July 1991) that Shamsir Jasani & Co, the seventh largest accounting firm in the country, had 130 staff and 
was backed by Grant Thornton International.
19From both the documented sources and interviews, a variety of answers is found as to why the MIA limited itself to play a 
“registering role” for two decades (see Azham, 2002).
20Note that this remark was probably made in response to the criticism made by the then Central Bank's Governor, Tan Sri Jaafar 
Hussein, towards the MACPA leadership (see The Malaysian Accountant, July 1986, p. 6).  Note also that an interviewee who 
had been involved with the MACPA investigation committee for several years mentioned that the MACPA could be stricter in 
punishing errant members.  
21 It is notable that the 1981, 1982 and 1984 Annual Reports of MACPA mentioned the various efforts conducted by the MACPA 
in confronting the issue of unregistered accountants.  The MACPA 1984 Annual Report for example, mentioned that the MACPA 
had sent a memorandum to the Accountant-General who was the MIA president.  Next it stated (p. 22): "We now await his action  
against persons identified in our memorandum as violating the provisions of the Accountants Act 1967."  Apparently, he did not 
do anything that could make a difference.  This should not perhaps be surprising due to the fact that these accountants were 
needed  in  the  then  fast  growing  economy which  was  facing  severe  shortage  of  qualified  accountants  (see  Committee  on 
International Accounting Operation and Education, 1976-78, of the American Accounting Association, 1978, p. 39; Ahmad-
Noordin, 1981, p. 25). 
22 Perhaps nothing else could describe the appalling state of audit during this period than the case of Bank 
Rakyat which was illustrated  in a 1979 Parliamentary White Paper. In summary, Bank Rakyat was established in 1950.  By 
1975, it had expanded its paid up capita to over RM 15 million and membership comprised of over twenty three thousands 
individuals and just over 1000 cooperative societies. It  faced acute financial problems from 1973 which resulted in it being 
rescued by the government in 1977.  The parliamentary paper revealed widespread corrupt activities by parties inside the bank 
and those related to it, including the external auditor, the audit firm Kassim Chan & Co.  And yet the auditor appeared to have 
escaped without censure or penalty.  An opposition MP Lim Kit Siang in a  speech in the Parliament in June 1979 argued (Siang, 
1982, p. 266): "In other countries, such negligence and conflict of interest could have resulted in professional action being taken 
against the firms of auditors, and I want to know what action  the Government has taken against Kassim Chan & Co. for its  
professional negligence and conflict of interest, leading to such colossal losses".  He also claimed (p. 265) that the role played 
by the auditor in the "Great Bank Rakyat Betrayal" was one of the "sorriest episodes" of all.
From an interview conducted with one of the leaders of the MACPA, it was found that except for the MACPA 
which suspended the membership of the audit partner in charge for “three months”, it appeared that (as far as he knew it) the  
government authorities in the form of for example, the Attorney General or the police had taken no action against the auditor as a 
consequence. Even the Ministry of Finance had failed to withdraw his audit licence.  As for the MIA that did not even have the 
right machinery in place in the form of investigative and disciplinary committees, there was nothing to be expected of it. In fact,  
in the MIA 1967-1987 Annual Report, this very auditor had been listed as an MIA council member since 1972. In other words, 
when the Bank Rakyat case became public and he was named in the Parliamentary White Paper for failing to do a proper audit 
and lacking independence,  not only did he not face any  sanctions from the MIA, but he also continued to act as a council 
member of the MIA, as if nothing had happened!
23That of the equity requirements on investment in most business enterprises: 30 percent equity in a business enterprise for 
Bumiputra, 40 percent for other Malaysians and 30 percent foreigners.
24In terms of the number of companies listed, the increase was from 321 listed in 1992 to over 500 companies by the end of 1995. 
At the end of 1993, the market value of the KLSE had also jumped to RM 620 billion - an increase of 152 percent from the RM 
246 billion recorded at the end of the previous year (NST, 14 May 1994). In 1993 too, the total volume and turnover rose to 108 
billion units valued at RM 387 billion, which exceeded the combined volume and turnover for the past 20 years! In 1994, the 
International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank, posted in the Internet that the KLSE's market capitalisation as 
at November 1993 was US$175 billions - the second biggest after Hong Kong among 22 emerging markets capitalisation. It is 
perhaps important to note that paralleling these numerical advances, the government during the same period had embarked on a 
number of steps related to the nation’s securities market – a continuation of those taken in the last half of 1980s.  These included 
requiring the formation of audit committee for listed companies (Akauntan Nasional,  Nov/Dec. 1993,  p.  26),  the setting up 
Securities Commission (SC) (Yusof, 1993; Mohd.-Salleh, 1993), both in 1993, and the upgrading of penalties for any breach of 
the KLSE listing requirements from public reprimands and suspension of trading to fines of up to RM 100,000 (NST, 30 Sept. 
1994) in the following year. Finally, in 1995, the government unveiled an 18-point liberalising package for the capital market 
with local and international objectives. 
25The merger proposal was rejected on 17 June, 1985.  Reason given was that there was no need for the merged body (the MICA) 
as there  was already  an accounting body in the country entrusted  with all  the required  tasks to spearhead  the accounting 
profession in the form of the MIA (MIA Annual Report, 1967-87, p. 11).  The interviews had however found that there was no 
"outright" rejection by the government. See Azham (2002).
26In other words, the MIA was supposed to be a full-fledged accounting professional body. In the following year however, in 
Parliament, at a time when the media was having a field day reporting on the public quarrels between the leaders of the MIA and 
the MACPA (see Azham, 2002), his deputy made remarks which were not encouraging at all to those in the MIA. He said that the 
MIA should continue to oversee the MACPA and other professional accounting bodies (The Star, 12 Oct. 1988; Business Times, 
12 Oct. 1988). Both bodies he claimed had different functions and responsibilities. He also said that through the Accountants Act 
1967, the MIA was set up to monitor, regulate and coordinate the accounting profession for the purpose of safeguarding public 
interest and ensuring high professional standards. The MIA in short was to act as mere supervisory and coordinating body for the 
rest of accounting professional bodies in the country.  
27The apparent exceptions took place in two cases: one in 1992 when the MIA president was reported to have said that the MIA 
had found from its recent investigation involving 40 accountants that there were auditors who had failed to issue proper audit 
report (NST, 12 Apr. 1992).  The other was in 1993 under the headline "MIA Warning to Errant Members" (NST, 28 Jan. 1993). 
However on closer inspection, the story involved members of MIA who colluded with unqualified accountants.  Thus, this story 
was nothing new.  It is because on this very subject of collusion between members and the so-called unqualified accountants, the 
MIA over the years was fond of issuing numerous statements to the media making one warning after another that stern action 
would be taken against its members with really no news as to whether  the actions in fact, had been taken.  See The Malay Mail  
(4 Feb. 1988; 26 Feb. 1992) and NST (17 Sept. 1988; 31 Jan. 1991).
28The MIA in contrast to  the MACPA did not divulge the types of disciplinary action taken against the members in its annual  
reports.  Why it did not find fit to clearly spell what these actions were appears to be one of those questions whose answers are 
anyone's guess.
29The excuse for no disciplinary actions taken in 1989 was this as appeared in the MIA 1989 Annual Report  (p.  13): Dato' 
Shamsir Omar who was sitting in the disciplinary committee left the council (and thus the committee too) due to his retirement 
from his position as the then Accountant-General.  As for the year 1990, the excuse as found in the MIA 1990 Annual Report (p. 
13) was this: shortage of manpower "especially" with the resignation of the Institute's legal officer.
30 Remarks made by the newly appointed finance minster (Akauntan Nasional, Sept/Oct 1991, p. 23; The Malaysian Accountant, 
June 1992,  p.  18)  and  the MIA itself (ASEAN Accounting Research Unit, 1992,  p.  75;  MIA 1992 Annual Report,  p.16) 
provided evidence of the fact that the country was facing a shortage problem of qualified accountants/auditors.  In the NST (12 
Apr. 1991), the following was also stated: "A Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) document says the shortage of auditors 
and tax consultants is very acute.  While there are over 172,000 companies registered with the Registrar of Companies, there are 
only about 600 approved company auditors." But the MIA from the time when it was activated had kept on shifting the date as to 
when it would start organising the professional examinations!
w
 And when the examination was finally set up in 1996, the MIA did 
not  provide a real  alternative or an actual additional avenue for locals wishing to qualify as accountants because it  was a 
combined effort of both the MIA and the CACA (Akauntan Nasional, Oct. 1995, p. 4). The collaborative exam structure was 
exactly the same as the UK based qualification which had been offered in the country for decades.  The difference between the 
two examinations was that students now had the option of sitting for the UK or Malaysian law variant papers.
31Note that Chandra Muzaffar and Aliran appear to be well versed in this subject matter.  Check for example Aliran (1981a, 
Chapter Three), Aliran (1981b), Aliran (1988a, Chapter Four) and Chandra (1989, pp. 47-56).  For more on the same subject, 
please check also the following: The speeches made by Lim Kit Siang on 25 October 1977, 27 October 1975 and 14 July 1971 
which appear in Siang (1978); the section entitled "On a Clean, Efficient and Democratic Government" in Siang (1986); and 
finally Schlossstein (1991, Chapter Four).
32 This could be because of the fact that by the late 1980s and early 1990s, even after a significant proportion of 
the economy had been transferred - under the so-called privatisation exercise - from the government to the private sector resulting 
to what was proclaimed to be a strong accounting profession, what appears to be the case was that much of the private sector was 
still in the hands of those associated closely with the government sector (see Gomez, 1997; Jomo, 1995). This section of the 
private sector may even be considered as an "extension" of the government sector where reigning politicians and their political 
parties had for years been deeply involved in the business sector (see Gomez, 1994, 1990; Leigh, 1992; Leong, 1988, Chapter 
Six; and Gale, 1985). There was merely a superficial rearrangement of wealth and thus power among the few in the society.  It is 
also notable that when it concerned the listing of a number of privatised entities at the KLSE, the percentage of shares offered for 
sale did not exceed thirty percent of the total shares (Mohd.-Sheriff, 1992): MAS, 30 percent; MISC, 17 percent; STM, 23.9 
percent;  and TNB,  22.8 percent.  As a  result,   partial  divestment of equity of government-owned entities provided  a means 
whereby, the government was still in the case of these companies, their major shareholder. 
This very fact is not surprising since the local corporate scene was filled with individuals or companies owning 
at least 51 percent of the shares of the so-called public companies including those listed on the KLSE.  So, even in the 1990s 
when the NEP era was supposed to have come to an end, the NST (30 May 1994) reported that more than two-thirds of the 335 
companies on the main board and all of the 92 on the second board were controlled either by one or a few shareholders with more 
than 51 percent of the shares. This domination was not illegal since the KLSE listing rules required no more than a public float of 
25 percent of the total shares issued. As a result, the listed companies still remained  private companies (Mohd.-Salleh, 1989). 
They were public and listed only in names. Many of the listed companies were labelled by chairman of the Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research (MIER), Datuk Dr. Kamal Salih, as "private-owned public company" (NST, 21 August 1991). Most shares 
were still held by insiders - family members, friends, clan members and others known personally to the companies' founders. And 
when it concerned  privatised entities including those listed on the KLSE, the shareholders were other government entities.  
Therefore, on the whole, the "principal-agent" dichotomy did not exist or was at best blurred in the Malaysian context. 
Even though more and more companies were formed from the 1970s onwards,
E
 many of these were "companies" merely in name - 
leading to various distressful conducts perpetrated by majority shareholders who also managed their daily affairs.  The unsavoury 
acts of these companies included the tendency to flout the law (Ram, 1985; Azham, 2002) and the reluctance to disclose much 
(Tong et al., 1989; Tong and Ann, 1996; Tay, 1994; Jaafar, 1992).  Thus, the need for a truly functional audit was still not as 
acute as would have been expected if indeed a new  political economic context had emerged after the two recessions in the 1980s. 
In fact, it appears that a weak audit profession that devoted more attention to promotional aspects than regulation suited certain 
parties, notwithstanding the rhetoric by a few among the power elite stressing from time to time the need for improvements in 
practice, stricter enforcement of rules and regulations, etc.  
33 Perhaps a good case in point is the "BMF Affair" that took place in the first half of 1980s that led to 
the loss of around US$1 billion and the death of the (internal) auditor who investigated the case.  Koon (1994) in her study of 
the BMF Affair pointed out what the government appeared to have done "to prevent" its public disclosure. On pages 194-95 of 
her thesis, she listed down the "systematic cover-up of the case from the Malaysian public" ranging from the denial made by the 
BBMB of the extent of its subsidiary’s (BMF) involvement in the Carrian Group in September 1982 to the creation of a limited 
Committee of Inquiry by the government after rejecting public demand for a Royal Commission in January 1984 and finally to 
the government’s reluctance to publish the report of the Committee of Inquiry in 1986.   Later, due to public's demand for 
publication, only 2,000 copies were published at the price of RM 250 which was beyond the reach of average Malaysians! 
 With all this in the background, it is perhaps not surprising to find that HRM as the auditor of the parent body 
BBMB was “quietly” replaced soon after by another auditor.  This apparently was the worst that could happen to an auditor  
whose audit opinion in its audit reports was the opposite of the stance taken by the Committee of Inquiry which disclosed that 
both audited financial statements of BMF and BBMB did not give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of BBMB and the 
Group as at 31 December 1981 (Siang, 1986, p. 36).
This revelation of what took place in the “private sector” may be added to those that came straight from those 
in the know in the arena of government operation where the leaders had repeatedly proclaimed the need for clean government and 
stiff actions against corrupt acts.   The then deputy accountant-general (Akauntan Nasional, Jan. 1990, p. 19),  noted that the 
government’s reaction had been indifferent towards accounting as a tool for effectiveness and efficiency. And from the former 
auditor-general,  Tan Sri  Ahmad Noordin,  the following was his remark when he was discussing value for  money audits in 
government operations (Ahmad-Noordin, 1986, p. 47):
We have accordingly amended or rather we had the Audit Act amended to ensure that the Auditor-General  has the 
necessary power within the law to carry out this value for money audit as I mentioned just now.  What seemed to be the 
constraint when I was there was that as value for money or performance audit penetrates into the activities of governments, 
there was a natural tendency for  authorities having the power to approve  staff for the Audit Office to make it difficult for the 
Audit Office to get the necessary skills and manpower to carry out this work.
Thus, it may safely be said that the debilitating atmosphere in the audit arena in the post-NEP era had been deliberate 
and intended to deflect attention from creating a "culture of accountability" or full public disclosure, because interested parties 
did not want to face the unnecessary "complication" of explaining themselves to anyone in their pursuit of gaining economic 
ascendancy.  This is  stated by Belkaoui (1974, as reported by Samuels and Piper, 1985, p. 141): a class elite in many developing 
countries are interested in maintaining secrecy, thus, the financial reporting system was purposely made to be weak so that it was 
easy for this elite to maintain secrecy for their own gain.
34Perhaps it was because at that time Malaysia was getting bogged down by the Asian Financial Crisis? So, there was no need for  
additional bad news that could only make the economy worse off? It  perhaps needs to be noted that on the eve of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, just a few months after the operation had begun, the NST  (8 July 1997) did file a report on remarks coming from 
the domestic trade and consumer affairs minister that there were five cases of auditors obstructing the ROC officers in conducting 
their inspection which to that date numbered to 123 audit firms.  He also mentioned that the southern branch of the MIA had sent 
out circulars asking its members not  to co-operate  with the ROC should their firms be called for inspection.  He therefore 
warned/advised the auditors to co-operate with the ROC or face legal action.
